Paper #1542
- Title:
- Political connections and informed trading: Evidence from TARP
- Authors:
- Ozlem Akin, Nicholas S. Coleman, Christian Fons-Rosen and José-Luis Peydró
- Date:
- October 2016 (Revised: March 2021)
- Abstract:
- We study insider trading behavior surrounding the largest bank bailout in history: TARP. In politically-connected banks, insider buying during the pre-TARP period is associated with increases in abnormal returns around bank-specific TARP announcement; for unconnected banks, trading and returns are uncorrelated. Results hold across insiders within the same bank and are stronger for finance-related government connections. Through a FOIA request we obtained the previously undisclosed TARP funds requested; the ratio of received to requested funds correlates both with abnormal returns and insider buying behavior in connected banks.
- Keywords:
- Political connections, Political economy in banking, Insider trading, TARP, bank bailouts
- JEL codes:
- D72, G01, G21, G28
- Area of Research:
- Business Economics and Industrial Organization / Finance and Accounting / Labour, Public, Development and Health Economics
- Published in:
- Financial Management, 50(3), 2021, pp. 619-644
Download the paper in PDF format (1,017 Kb)