Paper #1540
- Title:
- Collective commitment
- Authors:
- Christian Roessler, Sandro Shelegia and Bruno Strulovici
- Date:
- July 2016
- Abstract:
- We consider collective decisions made by agents whose preferences and power depend on past events and decisions. Faced with an inecient equilibrium and an opportunity to commit to a policy, can the agents reach an agreement on such a policy? We provide a consistency condition linking power structures in the dynamic setting and at the commitment stage. When the condition holds, commitment has no value: any agreement that may be reached at the outset coincides with the equilibrium without commitment. When the condition fails, as in the case of time-inconsistent preferences, commitment can improve outcomes. We discuss several applications.
- JEL codes:
- D70, H41, C70
- Area of Research:
- Business Economics and Industrial Organization
- Published in:
- Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming
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