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Paper #1306

Title:
Are self-regarding subjects more rational?
Authors:
Benito Arruñada, Marco Casari and Francesca Pancotto
Date:
January 2012
Abstract:
Through an experiment, we investigate how the level of rationality relates to concerns for equality and efficiency. Subjects perform dictator games and a guessing game. More rational subjects are not more frequently of the selfregarding type. When performing a comparison within the same degree of rationality, self-regarding subjects show more strategic sophistication than other subjects.
Keywords:
steps of reasoning, other-regarding preferences
JEL codes:
C91, C92, D63
Area of Research:
Business Economics and Industrial Organization
Published in:
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 9, 140, 2015.
With the title:
Pro-sociality and Strategic Reasoning in Economic Decisions.

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