Department of Economics and Business - Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Title:: A foundation for strategic agenda voting
Authors:: Jose Apesteguia, Miguel Ballester and Yusufcan Masatlioglu
Date:: February 2012
Abstract:: We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomes of two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democratic world: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure, and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomatic approach provides a proper understanding of these voting institutions, and allows comparisons between them, and with other voting procedures.
Keywords:: Strategic Voting, Agendas, Committees, Institutions, Axioms
JEL codes:: C72, D02, D71, D72
Area of Research:: Behavioral and Experimental Economics / Microeconomics
Published in:: Games and Economic Behavior, 87: 91-99, September 2014

Download the paper in PDF format