Paper #1270

Title:

Audit risk and rent extraction: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in Brazil

Authors:

Stephan Litschig and Yves Zamboni

Date:

April 2011 (Revised: June 2013)

Abstract:

We report results from a randomized policy experiment designed to test whether increased audit risk deters rent extraction in local public procurement and service delivery in Brazil. Our estimates suggest that temporarily increasing annual audit risk by about 20 percentage points reduced the proportion of irregular local procurement processes by about 17 percentage points. This reduction was driven entirely by irregularities involving mismanagement or corruption. In contrast, we find no evidence that increased audit risk affected the quality of publicly provided preventive and primary health care services -measured based on user satisfaction surveys- or compliance with national regulations of the conditional cash transfer program "Bolsa Família".

Keywords:

Corruption, Rents, Local Governments, Law Enforcement

JEL codes:

D73, D78, H41, H83, K42

Area of Research:

Labour, Public, Development and Health Economics

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