Paper #1187

Title:

The law of impersonal transactions

Author:

Benito Arruñada

Date:

November 2009 (Revised: September 2010)

Abstract:

Most economic interactions happen in a context of sequential exchange in which innocent third parties suffer information asymmetry with respect to previous "originative" contracts. The law reduces transaction costs by protecting these third parties but preserves some element of consent by property rightholders to avoid damaging property enforcement—e.g., it is they, as principals, who authorize agents in originative contracts. Judicial verifiability of these originative contracts is obtained either as an automatic byproduct of transactions or, when these would have remained private, by requiring them to be made public. Protecting third parties produces a legal commodity which is easy to trade impersonally, improving the allocation and specialization of resources. Historical delay in generalizing this legal commoditization paradigm is attributed to path dependency—the law first developed for personal trade—and an unbalance in vested interests, as luddite legal professionals face weak public bureaucracies.

Keywords:

Property rights, formalization, impersonal transactions.

JEL codes:

O17, K22, K23, L59.

Area of Research:

Business Economics and Industrial Organization / Finance and Accounting

Published in:

"The Law of Impersonal Transactions" in Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant, eds., The Manufacturing of Markets: Legal, Political and Economic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 58-77, 2014.

Download the paper in PDF format