Paper #1049

Title:

Enforcement problems and secondary markets

Authors:

Fernando Broner, Alberto Martin and Jaume Ventura

Date:

August 2007

Abstract:

There is a large and growing literature that studies the effects of weak enforcement institutions on economic performance. This literature has focused almost exclusively on primary markets, in which assets are issued and traded to improve the allocation of investment and consumption. The general conclusion is that weak enforcement institutions impair the workings of these markets, giving rise to various inefficiencies. But weak enforcement institutions also create incentives to develop secondary markets, in which the assets issued in primary markets are retraded. This paper shows that trading in secondary markets counteracts the effects of weak enforcement institutions and, in the absence of further frictions, restores efficiency.

Keywords:

Enforcement, default, secondary markets, sovereign risk, weak law enforcement

JEL codes:

F34, F36, G15

Area of Research:

Macroeconomics and International Economics

Published in:

Journal of the European Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, 6 (2-3), 683-694, 2008

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