Paper #909

Títol:

Optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a currency union

Autors:

Jordi Galí i Tommaso Monacelli

Data:

Octubre 2005 (Revisió: Febrer 2008)

Resum:

We lay out a tractable model for fiscal and monetary policy analysis in a currency union, and study its implications for the optimal design of such policies. Monetary policy is conducted by a common central bank, which sets the interest rate for the union as a whole. Fiscal policy is implemented at the country level, through the choice of government spending. The model incorporates country-specific shocks and nominal rigidities. Under our assumptions, the optimal cooperative policy arrangement requires that inflation be stabilized at the union level by the common central bank, while fiscal policy is used by each country for stabilization purposes. By contrast, when the fiscal authorities act in a non-coordinated way, their joint actions lead to a suboptimal outcome, and make the common central bank face a trade-off between inflation and output gap stabilization at the union level.

Paraules clau:

Monetary union, sticky prices, countercyclical policy, inflation differentials

Codis JEL:

E52, F41, E62

Àrea de Recerca:

Macroeconomia i Economia Internacional

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