Paper #907

Títol:

Existence of sparsely supported correlated equilibria

Autors:

Fabrizio Germano i Gábor Lugosi

Data:

Octubre 2005

Resum:

We show that every finite N-player normal form game possesses a correlated equilibrium with a precise lower bound on the number of outcomes to which it assigns zero probability. In particular, the largest games with a unique fully supported correlated equilibrium are two-player games; moreover, the lower bound grows exponentially in the number of players N.

Paraules clau:

Correlated equilibrium, finite games

Codis JEL:

C72

Àrea de Recerca:

Microeconomia / Estadística, Econometria i Mètodes Quantitatius

Publicat a:

Economic Theory (2007) 32: 575-578

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