Paper #800

Títol:

What do the papers sell?

Autors:

Matthew Ellman i Fabrizio Germano

Data:

Desembre 2004

Resum:

We model the market for news as a two-sided market where newspapers sell news to readers who value accuracy and sell space to advertisers who value advert-receptive readers. We show that monopolistic newspapers under-report or bias news that sufficiently reduces advertiser profits. Newspaper competition generally reduces the impact of advertising. In fact, as the size of advertising grows, newspapers may paradoxically reduce advertiser bias, due to increasing competition for readers. However, advertisers can counter this effect of competition by committing to news-sensitive cut-off strategies, potentially inducing as much under-reporting as in the monopoly case.

Paraules clau:

Two-sided markets, advertising, media accuracy, media bias, media economics.

Codis JEL:

L13, L82

Àrea de Recerca:

Direcció d'Empesa i Estudis de les Organitzacions

Publicat a:

Economic Journal, 119, 537, pp. 680-704. 2009
Amb el títol:
What do the papers sell? A model of advertising and media bias

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