Paper #783

Títol:

Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium

Autors:

Sergiu Hart i Andreu Mas-Colell

Data:

Octubre 2004

Resum:

In this paper we consider dynamic processes, in repeated games, that are subject to the natural informational restriction of uncoupledness. We study the almost sure convergence to Nash equilibria, and present a number of possibility and impossibility results. Basically, we show that if in addition to random moves some recall is introduced, then successful search procedures that are uncoupled can be devised. In particular, to get almost sure convergence to pure Nash equilibria when these exist, it su±ces to recall the last two periods of play.

Paraules clau:

Uncoupled, Nash equilibrium, stochastic dynamics, bounded recall

Codis JEL:

C7, D83

Àrea de Recerca:

Microeconomia

Publicat a:

Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 57, Num. 2, p. 286-303, Nov. 2006

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