Paper #761

Títol:

Stochastic evolution of rules for playing normal form games

Autor:

Fabrizio Germano

Data:

Juny 2004

Resum:

The evolution of boundedly rational rules for playing normal form games is studied within stationary environments of stochastically changing games. Rules are viewed as algorithms prescribing strategies for the different normal form games that arise. It is shown that many of the folk results of evolutionary game theory typically obtained with a fixed game and fixed strategies carry over to the present case. The results are also related to recent experiments on rules and games.

Paraules clau:

Rules, evolutionary dynamics, stochastic dynamics, bounded rationality, learning, normal form games

Codis JEL:

C72, C73, D81, D83

Àrea de Recerca:

Microeconomia

Publicat a:

Theory and Decision (2007) 62: 311-333

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