Paper #701

Títol:

On equilibria in duopolies with finite strategy spaces

Autor:

Kalyan Talluri

Data:

Juliol 2003

Resum:

We will call a game a reachable (pure strategy) equilibria game if starting from any strategy by any player, by a sequence of best-response moves we are able to reach a (pure strategy) equilibrium. We give a characterization of all finite strategy space duopolies with reachable equilibria. We describe some applications of the sufficient conditions of the characterization.

Paraules clau:

duopoly, equilibria, revenue management, discrete-choice theory

Codis JEL:

C0, D4, C7

Àrea de Recerca:

Estadística, Econometria i Mètodes Quantitatius

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