Paper #645
- Títol:
- Olson vs. Coase: Coalitional worth in conflict
- Autors:
- Joan Esteban i József Sákovics
- Data:
- Setembre 2002
- Resum:
- We analyze a model of conflict with endogenous choice of effort, where subsets of the contenders may force the resolution to be sequential: First the alliance fights it out with the rest and – in case they win – later they fight it out among themselves. For three-player games, we find that it will not be in the interest of any two of them to form an alliance. We obtain this result under two different scenarios: equidistant preferences with varying relative strengths, and vicinity of preferences with equal distribution of power. We conclude that the commonly made assumption of super-additive coalitional worth is suspect.
- Paraules clau:
- Coalition formation, conflict, alliance
- Codis JEL:
- D72, D74
- Àrea de Recerca:
- Microeconomia
- Publicat a:
- Theory and Decision 55, 339-357, 2004
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