Tornar a Working Papers

Paper #629

Títol:
Social preferences and skill segregation
Autors:
Antonio Cabrales i Antoni Calvó
Data:
Juliol 2002
Resum:
This paper shows that models where preferences of individuals depend not only on their allocations, but also on the well-being of other persons, can produce both large and testable effects. We study the allocation of workers with heterogeneous productivities to firms. We show that even small deviations from purely “selfish” preferences leads to widespread workplace skill segregation. That is, workers of different abilities tend to work in di¤erent firms, as long as they care somewhat more about the utilities of workers who are “close”.
Paraules clau:
Contract theory, mechanism design, envy, social preferences, skill segregation
Codis JEL:
A13, C72, D64, D80, J41
Àrea de Recerca:
Economia Experimental i del Comportament / Economia de l'Empresa i Organització Industrial / Microeconomia

Descarregar el paper en format PDF (204 Kb)

Cercar Working Papers


Per data:
-cal seleccionar un valor a les quatre llistes desplegables-



Consultes Predefinides