Paper #529

Títol:

Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: A managerial perspective

Autor:

Nuno Garoupa

Data:

Novembre 2000

Resum:

Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economic theory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes? Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Should corporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two major contributions to the literature. First, it provides a common analytical framework to most results presented and largely discussed in the field. In second place, by making use of the framework, we provide new insights into how corporations should be punished for the offenses committed by their employees.

Paraules clau:

Law Enforcement, Corporation

Codis JEL:

K4

Àrea de Recerca:

Economia de l'Empresa i Organització Industrial

Publicat a:

Managerial and Decision Economics, 21, 6, (2000), pp.243-252

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