Paper #525

Títol:

Campaign rhetoric: A model of reputation

Autors:

Enriqueta Aragonés i Andrew Postlewaite

Data:

Setembre 2000

Resum:

We analyze conditions under which a candidate's campaign rhetoric may affect the beliefs of the voters over what policy the candidate will implement in case he wins the election. We develop a model of repeated elections with complete information in which candidates are purely ideological. Voter's strategies involve a credible threat to punish candidates that renege of their campaign promises, and in equilibrium all campaign promises are believed by voters, and honored by candidates. We obtain that the degree to which promises are credible in equilibrium is an increasing function of the value of a candidate's reputation.

Paraules clau:

Electoral campaigns, reputation, commitment

Codis JEL:

D72

Àrea de Recerca:

Microeconomia

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