Paper #481

Títol:

A theory of international conflict management and sanctioning

Autors:

Nuno Garoupa i Joao E. Gata

Data:

Juny 2000

Resum:

In this paper we analyze sanctioning policies in international law. We develop a model of international military conflict where the conflicting countries can be a target of international sanctions. These sanctions constitute an equilibrium outcome of an international political market for sanctions, where different countries trade political influence. We show that the level of sanctions in equilibrium is strictly positive but limited, in the sense that higher sanctions would exacerbate the military conflict, not reduce it. We then propose an alternative interpretation to the perceived lack of effectiveness of international sanctions, by showing that the problem might not be one of undersanctioning but of oversanctioning.

Paraules clau:

Conflict management, international sanctions, arms embargo, international political market, pressure groups

Codis JEL:

C72, D74, K33

Àrea de Recerca:

Economia de l'Empresa i Organització Industrial

Publicat a:

Public Choice, 110, 1, (2002), pp. 41-65

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