Paper #410

Títol:

Financial intermediation and equity investment with costly monitoring

Autor:

Giorgio Di Giorgio

Data:

Setembre 1999

Resum:

This paper studies the efficiency of equilibria in a productive OLG economy where the process of financial intermediation is characterized by costly state verification. Both competitive equilibria and Constrained Pareto Optimal allocations are characterized. It is shown that market outcomes can be socially inefficient, even when a weaker notion than Pareto optimality is considered.

Paraules clau:

Financial intermediation, costly state verification, Constrained Pareto Optimality

Codis JEL:

E44, E62

Àrea de Recerca:

Finances i Comptabilitat

Publicat a:

International Review of Economcis and Finance, vol.11, 2002

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