Paper #370

Títol:

Self-serving biases: Evidence from a simulated labor relationship

Autors:

Gary Charness i Ernan Haruvy

Data:

Gener 1999

Resum:

Previous studies have found evidence of a self-serving bias in bargaining and dispute resolution. We use experimental data to test for this effect in a simulated labor relatonship. We find a consistent discrepancy between employer beliefs and employee actions that can only be attributed to self-serving biases. This discrepancy is evident through stated beliefs, revealed satisfaction, and actual actions. We present evidence and discuss implications.

Paraules clau:

Experiment, fairness, labor relations, self-serving bias, Leex

Codis JEL:

C70, C91, D21, J30

Àrea de Recerca:

Economia Experimental i del Comportament

Publicat a:

Journal of Managerial Psychology

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