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Paper #366

Títol:
Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization
Autor:
Nuno Garoupa
Data:
Març 1999
Resum:
In this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished, (iii) employees present a major threat to the entrepreneur having the most detailed knowledge concerning participation, (iv) separation between ownership and management is difficult because record-keeping and auditing augments criminal evidence.
Paraules clau:
Organized crime, punishment, plea-bargaining
Codis JEL:
K4
Àrea de Recerca:
Economia de l'Empresa i Organització Industrial

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