Paper #351

Títol:

Credit cycles in theory and experiment

Autors:

Antoni Bosch-Domènech i María Sáez

Data:

Gener 1999

Resum:

We test in the laboratory the potential of evolutionary dynamics as predictor of actual behavior. To this end, we propose an asymmetric game -which we interpret as a borrowerlender relation-, study its evolutionary dynamics in a random matching set-up, and tests its predictions. The model provides conditions for the existence of credit markets and credit cycles. The theoretical predictions seem to be good approximations of the experimental results.

Paraules clau:

Cycles, evolutionary dynamics, games, experiments, Leex

Codis JEL:

C7, C9, E3

Àrea de Recerca:

Economia Experimental i del Comportament

Publicat a:

Games and Economic Behavior, 36, (2001), pp. 105-137

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