Paper #322

Títol:

Responsibility-allevation and effort provision in a gift-exchange experiment

Autor:

Gary Charness

Data:

Setembre 1998

Resum:

Previous indirect evidence suggests that impulses towards pro-social behavior are diminished when an external authority is responsible for an outcome. The responsibility-alleviation effect states that a shift of responsibility to an external authority dampens internal impulses toward honesty, loyalty, or generosity. In a gift-exchange experiment, we find that subjects respond with more generosity (higher effort) when a wage is determined by a random process than when it is assigned by a third party, indicating that even a slight shift in perceived responsibility for the final payoffs can change behavior. Responsibility-alleviation is a factor in economic environments featuring substantial personal interaction.

Paraules clau:

Responsibility, social behavior, experiment, generosity, Leex

Codis JEL:

A13, C91, D63, J20, J52

Àrea de Recerca:

Economia Experimental i del Comportament

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