- Títol:
- Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games
- Autors:
- Nir Dagan i Roberto Serrano
- Data:
- Gener 1997
- Resum:
- By introducing physical outcomes in coalitional games we note that
coalitional games and social choice problems are equivalent (implying that
so are the theory of implementation and the Nash program). This facilitates
the understanding of the role of invariance and randomness in the Nash
program. Also, the extent to which mechanisms in the Nash program perform
``real implementation'' is examined.
- Paraules clau:
- Coalitional games, social choice, Nash program, implementation, scale invariance, ordinal invariance, randomness
- Codis JEL:
- C70
- Àrea de Recerca:
- Microeconomia
- Publicat a:
- Economics Letters, 58, 43-49, 1998