Paper #1928

Títol:

Clerks

Autors:

Daniel Fershtman, Kfir Eliaz i Alexander Frug

Data:

Agost 2025

Resum:

We study optimal dynamic scheduling of workers to tasks when task completion is privately observed —so that workers can delay the release of finished tasks — and idle time is the only available incentive instrument. We characterize a scheduling rule, and its induced equilibrium, that maximizes expected discounted output. Unless workers are inherently slow, production alternates between efficient phases and delays. Our analysis reveals a trade-off between the quality and the size of the workforce. We also present several extensions, illustrating the versatility of the framework.

Paraules clau:

moral hazard , strategic servers , non-monetary incentives , optimal scheduling , idle time , multi-server systems

Codis JEL:

D82, J24, C73

Àrea de Recerca:

Microeconomia

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