Paper #1911

Títol:

Safe implementation in mixed nash equilibrium

Autors:

Anand Chopra, Malachy James Gavan i Antonio Penta

Data:

Juny 2025

Resum:

Safe Implementation (Gavan and Penta, 2025) combines standard implementation with the requirement that the implementing mechanism is such that, if up to k agents deviate from the relevant solution concept, the outcomes that are induced are still ‘acceptable’ at every state of the world. In this paper, we study Safe Implementation of social choice correspondences in mixed Nash Equilibrium. We identify a condition, Set-Comonotonicity, which is both necessary and (under mild domain restrictions) almost sufficient for this implementation notion.

Paraules clau:

Implementation, mechanism design, robustness, safe implementation, mixed implementation, Set-Comonotonicity

Codis JEL:

C72, D82

Àrea de Recerca:

Microeconomia

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