Paper #1851

Títol:

Self-preferencing and foreclosure in digital markets: Theories of harm for abuse cases

Autor:

Massimo Motta

Data:

Desembre 2022

Resum:

Antitrust agencies all over the world have been investigating large digital platforms for practices which may constitute an abuse of dominance. Here I discuss practices (including "selfpreferencing" and denial or degradation of interoperability) which can be interpreted as foreclosure in vertically-related or complementary markets. I discuss in particular a few high-profile cases involving Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google. I focus on possible theories of harm for such cases and show that both original simple models and well-established economic theories (adapted or interpreted) provide a rationale for anti-competitive foreclosure.

Paraules clau:

self-preferencing, abuse of dominance, monopolization, exclusionary practices, digital platforms, two-sided markets, vertical foreclosure

Codis JEL:

D40, K21,L10, L40

Àrea de Recerca:

Microeconomia

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