Paper #1695

Títol:

The organization of public registries: A comparative analysis

Autor:

Benito Arruñada

Data:

Febrer 2020 (Revisió: Setembre 2021)

Resum:

This work analyzes the main tradeoffs in the organization of public registries, comparing five forms of organization: (1) the bureaucracies or "discretionary expense centers" used to provide privately valuable services in the welfare state; (2) the internal markets introduced to reform them, and the hybrid solutions that have been used by the liberal state since the 19th century to provide such privately valuable services, including (3) revenue centers based on user fees; (4) franchised systems in which professional civil servants are paid from the profit of an office; and (5) the contemporary variant in which the Government contracts out the provision of the whole service to a private firm. This comparison suggests that hybrid forms allow market forces to play a more effective role in organizing public registries because they are limited to a few variables, which makes stronger incentives possible while, at the same time, reducing the need for extensive planning and supervisory staff.

Paraules clau:

internal markets, competition, bureaucracy, registries, welfare, incentives, user fees, user choice, privatization

Codis JEL:

H11, H42, H51, H52, K23

Àrea de Recerca:

Economia de l'Empresa i Organització Industrial

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