Paper #1690
- Títol:
- Optimal contracts with randomly arriving tasks
- Autors:
- Daniel Bird i Alexander Frug
- Data:
- Gener 2020
- Resum:
- Workers rarely perform exactly the same tasks every day. Instead, their daily workload may change randomly over time to comply with the uctuating needs of the organiza- tion where they are employed. In this paper, we show that this typical randomness in workplaces has a striking e ect on the structure of long-term employment contracts. In particular, simple intertemporal variability in the worker's tasks is sucient to gen- erate a rich promotion-based dynamics in which, occasionally, the worker receives a (permanent) wage raise and his future work requirements are reduced.
- Paraules clau:
- Dynamic contracting, random tasks, seniority, promotion.
- Codis JEL:
- D86, M51
- Àrea de Recerca:
- Microeconomia
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