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Paper #1667

Títol:
How effective are monetary incentives to vote? Evidence from a nationwide policy
Autors:
Gonzales Mariella, Gianmarco León-Ciliotta i Luis R. Martinez
Data:
Desembre 2018 (Revisió: Juliol 2019)
Resum:
We combine two natural experiments, multiple empirical strategies and administrative data to study voters' response to marginal changes to the fine for electoral abstention in Peru. A smaller fine leads to a robust decrease in voter turnout. However, the drop in turnout caused by a full ne reduction is less than 20% the size of that caused by an exemption from compulsory voting, indicating the predominance of the non-monetary incentives provided by the mandate to vote. Additionally, almost 90% of the votes generated by a marginally larger ne are blank or invalid, lending support to the hypothesis of rational abstention. Higher demand for information and larger long-run effects following an adjustment to the value of the ne point to the existence of informational frictions that limit adaptation to institutional changes.
Paraules clau:
voter turnout, voter registration, compulsory voting, informational frictions, external validity, Peru
Codis JEL:
D72, D78, D83, K42
Àrea de Recerca:
Economia Política

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