Paper #1667

Títol:

How effective are monetary incentives to vote? Evidence from a nationwide policy

Autors:

Gonzales Mariella, Gianmarco León-Ciliotta i Luis R. Martinez

Data:

Desembre 2018

Resum:

We combine two natural experiments, multiple empirical strategies and administrative data to study voters' response to marginal changes to the fine for electoral abstention in Peru. A smaller fine leads to a robust decrease in voter turnout. However, the drop in turnout caused by a full ne reduction is less than 20% the size of that caused by an exemption from compulsory voting, indicating the predominance of the non-monetary incentives provided by the mandate to vote. Additionally, almost 90% of the votes generated by a marginally larger ne are blank or invalid, lending support to the hypothesis of rational abstention. Higher demand for information and larger long-run effects following an adjustment to the value of the ne point to the existence of informational frictions that limit adaptation to institutional changes.

Paraules clau:

voter turnout, voter registration, compulsory voting, informational frictions, external validity, Peru

Codis JEL:

D72, D78, D83, K42

Àrea de Recerca:

Economia Política

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