Paper #1608

Títol:

Blockchain: The birth of decentralized governance

Autors:

Benito Arruñada i Luis Garicano

Data:

Abril 2018

Resum:

By allowing networks to split, decentralized blockchain platforms protect members against hold up, but hinder coordination, given that adaptation decisions are ultimately decentralized. The current solutions to improve coordination, based on “premining” cryptocoins, taxing members and incentivizing developers, are insufficient. For blockchain to fulfill its promise and outcompete centralized firms, it needs to develop new forms of “soft” decentralized governance (anarchic, aristocratic, democratic, and autocratic) that allow networks to avoid bad equilibria.

Paraules clau:

blockchain, platforms, networks, hold‐up, coordination, relational capital, incomplete contracts, decentralized governance

Codis JEL:

D23, L12, L22, L86

Àrea de Recerca:

Economia de l'Empresa i Organització Industrial

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