Paper #1544

Títol:

Strategic gradual learning and information transmission

Autor:

Alexander Frug

Data:

Setembre 2016

Resum:

Prior to advising a decision maker, the expert needs to gather information about the state of the world. This often takes time and therefore, even if the expert's learning process is unobservable, the timing of the advice is informative in itself. If learning is strategic in that the expert can choose which inspections to perform, the timing of advice may reveal not only the amount but also the type of information available to the expert. This paper studies the expert's covert and strategic process of information acquisition and its effect on the quality of advice. The main result of this paper suggests that, even in the absence of an "objective" reason to expedite information transmission, putting the biased expert under an artificial (or "strategic") pressure, can increase the amount of transmitted information and be beneficial to both players.

Paraules clau:

Gradual Learning, Strategic Pressure, Scheduling of Experiments, Dynamic Information Transmission, Cheap Talk.

Codis JEL:

D82, D83.

Àrea de Recerca:

Microeconomia

Descarregar el paper en format PDF