Tornar a Working Papers

Paper #1542

Títol:
Political connections and informed trading: Evidence from TARP
Autors:
Ozlem Akin, Nicholas S. Coleman, Christian Fons-Rosen i José-Luis Peydró
Data:
Octubre 2016
Resum:
We study insider trading behavior surrounding the largest bank bailout in history: TARP. In politically-connected banks, insider buying during the pre-TARP period is associated with increases in abnormal returns around bank-specific TARP announcement; for unconnected banks, trading and returns are uncorrelated. Results hold across insiders within the same bank and are stronger for finance-related government connections. Through a FOIA request we obtained the previously undisclosed TARP funds requested; the ratio of received to requested funds correlates both with abnormal returns and insider buying behavior in connected banks.
Paraules clau:
Political connections, Political economy in banking, Insider trading, TARP, bank bailouts
Codis JEL:
D72, G01, G21, G28
Àrea de Recerca:
Economia de l'Empresa i Organització Industrial / Finances i Comptabilitat / Economia Laboral, Pública, de Desenvolupament i de la Salut
Publicat a:
Financial Management, 50(3), 2021, pp. 619-644

Descarregar el paper en format PDF