Paper #1306

Títol:

Are self-regarding subjects more rational?

Autors:

Benito Arruñada, Marco Casari i Francesca Pancotto

Data:

Gener 2012

Resum:

Through an experiment, we investigate how the level of rationality relates to concerns for equality and efficiency. Subjects perform dictator games and a guessing game. More rational subjects are not more frequently of the selfregarding type. When performing a comparison within the same degree of rationality, self-regarding subjects show more strategic sophistication than other subjects.

Paraules clau:

steps of reasoning, other-regarding preferences

Codis JEL:

C91, C92, D63

Àrea de Recerca:

Economia de l'Empresa i Organització Industrial

Publicat a:

Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 9, 140, 2015.
Amb el títol:
Pro-sociality and Strategic Reasoning in Economic Decisions.

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