Paper #1302

Títol:

A foundation for strategic agenda voting

Autors:

Jose Apesteguia, Miguel Ballester i Yusufcan Masatlioglu

Data:

Febrer 2012

Resum:

We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomes of two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democratic world: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure, and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomatic approach provides a proper understanding of these voting institutions, and allows comparisons between them, and with other voting procedures.

Paraules clau:

Strategic Voting, Agendas, Committees, Institutions, Axioms

Codis JEL:

C72, D02, D71, D72

Àrea de Recerca:

Economia Experimental i del Comportament / Microeconomia

Publicat a:

Games and Economic Behavior, 87: 91-99, September 2014

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