Paper #1256
- Títol:
- Concentration and self-censorship in commercial media
- Autors:
- Fabrizio Germano i Martin Meier
- Data:
- Desembre 2010
- Resum:
- Within a simple model of non-localized, Hotelling-type competition among arbitrary numbers of media outlets we characterize quality and content of media under different ownership structures. Assuming advertising-sponsored, profit-maximizing outlets, we show that (i) topics sensitive to advertisers can be underreported (self-censored) by all outlets in the market, (ii) self-censorship increases with the concentration of ownership, (iii) adding outlets, while keeping the number of owners fixed, may even increase self-censorship; the latter result relies on consumers' most preferred outlets being potentially owned by the same media companies. We argue that externalities resulting from self-censorship could be empirically large.
- Paraules clau:
- Media economics; media consolidation; media markets; advertising and commercial media bias.
- Codis JEL:
- L13; L82.
- Àrea de Recerca:
- Microeconomia
- Publicat a:
- Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 97, pp. 117-130, 2013
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