Paper #1093

Títol:

Interviews and adverse selection

Autors:

Jens Josephson i Joel Shapiro

Data:

Maig 2008

Resum:

Interviewing in professional labor markets is a costly process for firms. Moreover, poor screening can have a persistent negative impact on firms’ bottom lines and candidates’ careers. In a simple dynamic model where firms can pay a cost to interview applicants who have private information about their own ability, potentially large inefficiencies arise from information-based unemployment, where able workers are rejected by firms because of their lack of offers in previous interviews. This effect may make the market less efficient than random matching. We show that the first best can be achieved using either a mechanism with transfers or one without transfers.

Paraules clau:

Decentralized Labor Markets, Professional Labor Markets, Asymmetric Information, Interview costs, Matching

Codis JEL:

D82, J21, J44

Àrea de Recerca:

Microeconomia / Economia Laboral, Pública, de Desenvolupament i de la Salut

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